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Abstract 
 This research performs forensic schedule analysis of delay factors that impacted 
recent large-scale military construction projects in the Middle East.  The purpose of this 
study is to understand the most significant causes of project delay and how AFCEC might 
improve schedule management performance.  The methodologies for analysis are adapted 
from the Professional Practice Guide to Forensic Schedule Analysis, particularly 
Method 3.7 Modeled/Additive/Multiple Base, or Time Impacted Analysis—Adjusted.  
The data is gathered from USACE and AFCEC, consisting of Primavera project 
schedules and project documents from the Resident Management System database.  The 
project delays from two large-scale projects are apportioned as compensable, excusable, 
or non-excusable based on their liability and their impacts to the critical path.  This 
investigation reveals that two particular delay factors are the most significant contributors 
to schedule overrun, accounting for 62% of the total delay.  Obtaining building permits, 
an owner (government) responsibility, contributed to 38% of the delays.  Design issues, 
consisting of change orders and submittal approvals, accounted for another 24% of the 
delays.  In order to reduce schedule delay in future projects, several recommendations are 
provided that focus on various aspects of project management. 
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FORENSIC SCHEDULE ANALYSIS OF CONSTRUCTION DELAY IN MILITARY 
PROJECTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
 Complex, large-scale construction projects frequently suffer from both schedule 
and cost overruns.  Despite the vast resources of the Department of Defense, its Military 
Construction (MILCON) program—a critical support element to the United States’ 
national defense system—is not exempt from those challenges.  In fact, executing 
projects in overseas or wartime environments typically amplifies construction 
complications, which results in wasted resources at best, or imperils missions at worst.  
The Department of Defense maintains a portfolio of over $100 million per year in large-
scale construction projects in the Middle East, most often utilizing the Air Force Civil 
Engineering Center (AFCEC) and the United States Corps of Engineers (USACE) as 
construction agents (Thibault, 2011).  The stated mission of AFCEC includes providing 
support “that enables the warfighter,” which inherently includes the rapid delivery of 
construction requirements.  Despite the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in December, 
2011, and the drawdown of forces from Afghanistan in 2014, the US continues to invest 
heavily in facilities and infrastructure at enduring military base locations throughout the 
Middle East.  As the sponsor and recipient for this research, AFCEC wishes to better 
understand the causes of MILCON schedule overruns in order to benefit future projects, 
whether in that region or a different wartime location.  To that end, this introduction 
discusses the background of the research problem, briefly considers existing research on 
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the subject, and then concludes with a brief overview of the scope and methodology for 
this thesis. 
 While common causes of construction delay have already been identified in 
academia, previous research efforts are typically limited to projects in individual 
countries or target specific project types.  Very little research is available, at present, to 
shed light on the primary causes of US military construction delay in contingency 
environments.  However, three recent studies have examined construction difficulties in 
the war-torn nations of Iraq and Afghanistan.  The first study was sponsored by USACE 
and performed by Affleck et al. (2011), who determined the most frequent construction 
challenges by conducting surveys of construction personnel in Afghanistan.  The second 
study was an Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) thesis by Jaszkowiak (2012).  She 
used quantitative data and personnel surveys in both Iraq and Afghanistan to research the 
relationship between project cost and schedule performance based on different contract 
types.  The third study was an AFIT thesis by Hoff (2015) that both examined the 
primary factors that affect cost and schedule performance on projects completed in 
Afghanistan and examined the difference in outcomes based on contract types.  The 
results of these three research projects provide important insight, but they fail to address 
several issues concerning the causes of MILCON delays and how to eliminate or reduce 
them.  Consequently, this thesis seeks to build upon the three previous research efforts for 
a more in-depth schedule analysis of AFCEC construction projects in the Middle East. 
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Problem Statement 
 There are usually many root-causes that contribute to construction schedule 
overrun.  However, there may also be predictive performance metrics, common delay 
factors, or proven management techniques that will help project managers predict, 
reduce, or eliminate delays.  There is limited knowledge regarding these delay factors and 
measures for contingency construction projects.  As such, the training framework and 
management toolbox made available to government project managers does not 
adequately equip them to successfully control project schedules. 
Research Objectives 
 The objective of this thesis is to understand which factors are most significant in 
causing delay to recent large-scale AFCEC projects constructed in the Middle East.  A 
literature review will reveal different types of project delay, predictive schedule 
performance factors, common causes of delay, and provide guidance on a variety of 
methods by which to analyze construction schedules.  Accordingly, this thesis will seek 
to answer the following question: 
 Which factors are the most significant causes of schedule delay in large-scale 
 AFCEC construction projects in the Middle East? 
Scope and Methodology 
 This study will examine two large-scale construction projects at US bases in 
countries that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which are Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates.  These base locations are 
currently utilized as a network that provides both logistical and operational support to 
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full-fledged war campaigns, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as support to smaller 
conflicts and humanitarian missions in the Middle East region.  Projects executed in these 
locations are federally funded and line-item approved for the exclusive use of the US 
government.  This study will focus on projects that have been completed as of June, 2015 
and look back at projects completed within the last ten years.  Additionally, this study 
will examine projects that were managed in partnership by USACE and AFCEC, for 
which the primary customer is Air Force Central Command (AFCENT).  The data for 
these projects is contained in the Resident Management System (RMS), a project 
management software program created and used by USACE.  To aid in the data 
collection and analysis for this research, a memorandum of agreement for mutual support 
between USACE, AFCEC, AFCENT and AFIT was established. 
 A modern method of examining the intricacies of construction schedules was 
developed in 2007 in the form of a practitioner’s guide titled, “Forensic Schedule 
Analysis” (Hoshino et al., 2007) and applied to this research.  Two investigations were 
conducted for each project.  The first step analyzed the schedule history of each project to 
gain a thorough understanding of the delays.  The second step reviewed the daily 
construction reports for each project to identify all major deficiencies.  The deficiency 
data was summarized and sorted into categories. The classification of data identified 
factor groups for schedule performance analysis.  The primary method to categorize the 
causes of delay was excusability and compensability, which categorizes each delay event 
based on liability.  After a review of literature in Chapter 2 to establish support for these 
techniques, an explanation of the methodology will be detailed in Chapter 3.  In 
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Chapter 4, the appropriate analysis methods are applied to the selected construction 
projects.  A review of the findings and a conclusion are presented in Chapter 5. 
Significance 
 This research effort is action research in support of a current operational need.  
The body of knowledge within the field of construction schedule delay already contains 
several studies identifying the common causes of delay and the methods to accurately 
apportion those delays.  This study is unique from previous research in two ways.  First, 
it uses project records to identify specific causes of delay.  While this method is not new, 
it differs from the norm of using survey instruments in academia.  Second, no other study 
has applied forensic schedule analysis techniques to large-scale military construction 
projects overseas.  Consequently, it provides a quantitative analysis at a deeper level than 
previously seen.  The results provide government project managers an instrument by 
which to anticipate and decrease potential delays afflicting vital projects.  Furthermore, 
this research aims to afford the government opportunities to achieve resource savings and 
improve delivery of support to the warfighter. 
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II.  Literature Review 
 Project construction schedules are the primary instrument by which managers 
control and monitor progress and contract performance (Smith et al., 2009).  When the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting published its report in 2011 about fraud, waste, and 
abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan, project schedule delay was faulted as a significant 
contributor to wasteful spending of US tax dollars (Thibault, 2011).  A comprehensive 
investigation of existing literature identifies the most common and significant issues 
related to construction delay.  The following literature review begins by considering 
construction contracts and schedules, along with the various types of delay.  After 
defining delay, it continues with a discussion of schedule analysis methods available in 
industry.  Next, this review looks at how academia uses models to predict schedule delay, 
before shifting to the key factors that scholars have determined are the most influential in 
delaying large-scale construction projects.  It then concludes with a review of literature 
that focuses on the more specific subtopics of international construction projects and 
military construction delay. 
Construction Contracts and Schedules 
 Large-scale construction projects are administered through contracts and 
schedules, whereby they legally formalize the relationship and requirements of all 
participants.  The contract establishes responsibilities for each party, including what they 
agree to accomplish and when they shall begin and end.  The terms of the contract are 
considered binding and provide for enforcement of legal protections.  If a party fails to 
follow the agreement, it constitutes a breach of contract for which a variety of 
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mechanisms can be exercised to assure the right of other parties to be made whole.  In 
construction, damages are typically direct or consequential and therefore compensatory in 
nature (Smith et al., 2009:462).  In the event of project delay, liquidated damages are 
assessed to approximate a fair monetary value for the harm caused to the owner; if a 
contractor fails to finish a project by the agreed completion date, the owner is entitled to 
collect the liquidated damages.  If there is sufficient reason to believe a contractor cannot 
complete a project on time, the owner may terminate the contract for default—typically 
an instrument of last resort. 
 While the start and end dates of a project are contractual, the rest of the details 
describing when each step of the project shall be completed are left to the contractor, as 
contained in a separate document—the project schedule.  Modern project scheduling 
software provide users a wide range of management tools and the ability to include a 
variety of data, such as a list of milestones, activities, subactivities, resources, and the 
network of relationships between all of them.  In order to expedite the construction 
process, many activities are performed simultaneously.  Ultimately, one or more series of 
activities are designated as the critical path for a project and are used to determine the 
total duration of the project (Woolf, 2008).  Construction contracts establish a period of 
performance, which is a number of calendar days provided for the contractor to complete 
the work described therein.  The period of performance for a contractor is typically based 
on a project’s total duration, determined by the sum of the durations of each activity that 
falls along the critical path, in addition to any extra time deliberately added to allow for 
flexibility and unavoidable delays.  While a non-excusable delay to the final completion 
date is considered a breach of contract, and thereby results in post hoc damages, delays to 
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activities or milestones during the course of a project that are anticipated to affect the 
completion date might actually be mitigated later as the schedule progresses.  Therefore, 
assessment of liquidated damages for construction delays is reserved until the end of a 
project, when the final count of delay days can be determined and liability can be 
adjudicated. 
What Is Delay? 
 Due to the complex nature of construction projects, it is impossible to predict all 
factors that could potentially affect project schedules.  There are few undertakings that 
require more resources, manpower, planning, and coordination than large-scale 
construction projects.  As noted by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, “except in 
the middle of a battlefield, nowhere must men coordinate the movement of other men and 
all materials in the midst of such chaos and with such limited certainty of present facts 
and future occurrences as in a huge construction project…” (Blake v. Coakley, 
1981).  When high costs of large projects and the reputations of organizations are added 
to the equation, the stakes are further raised and it is common for parties to blame each 
other for delays and seek recompense.  It is easy to understand why the construction 
industry is so frequently an adversarial environment and its conflict resolution process is 
so often litigious (Thompson et al., 2000).  Through the evolution of US construction 
law, three different types of construction delay have gained definitive significance in 
order to clearly assign fault and establish which parties shall bear the costs of the delay.  
The following types of delay are further explained below: 1) compensable; 2) excusable, 
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but not compensable; and 3) nonexcusable.  Fundamentally, compensability is concerned 
with fiscal reparation, while excusability appertains to time extensions. 
Compensable Delay 
 Compensable delays are caused solely by the owner, whether by negligence, 
omission, or purposeful acts.  Any conduct by the owner which violates the strictures of 
the contract and forces additional costs upon the contractor or subcontractor should be 
borne by the owner (Dale & D’Onofrio, 2014:5).  Fiscal compensation is the repayment 
of those costs to which the contractor is entitled.  Compensable delay is inherently also 
excusable and thereby entitles the contractor to additional days to accomplish the work.  
Some examples of typical causes of compensable delay include defective drawings or 
specifications, improper site preparation, failure to provide access to the construction site, 
failure to supply materials, failure to approve submittals, failure to make timely progress 
payments, suspensions of work, and excessive change orders (Smith et al., 2009:284-
288).  When the owner is liable for delays and associated costs, the contractor is 
responsible for identifying and proving the claim in order to recover damages. 
Excusable Delay 
 Excusable, but not compensable, delays are attributed to events beyond the 
control of either party and are thereby considered “no fault” or “shared fault” periods.  
These are often referred to as “force majeure” delays, as liability cannot be reasonably 
attributed to owners or contractors (Dale & D’Onofrio, 2014:8).  The most common 
example of this type of delay is severe weather that prevents construction progress.  In 
these situations, the contractor is granted additional days to accomplish the work, 
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equivalent to the amount of days delayed.  The Federal Acquisition Regulation 
enumerates examples of excusable-but-noncompensable delays: acts of God or of the 
public enemy, acts of the Government, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, 
strikes, embargoes, and unusually severe weather (FAR 52.249-10).  The common theme 
illustrated by those examples is that the event must be both unforeseeable and beyond the 
control of either party.  However, the mere presence of harsh weather does not 
automatically guarantee the contractor will receive additional days to complete its work 
(Smith et al., 2009:290-291).  Just as in the case of compensable delays, the burden of 
proof that a delay is excusable belongs to the contractor to establish when presenting its 
claim for additional days.  Claims must therefore demonstrate how the actual weather 
exceeded the severity and probability of the expected weather (Finke, 1990).  While 
creating initial construction schedules, contractors should incorporate an appropriate 
number of days to account for typical or average weather, at a minimum, anticipated for 
the region.  Most other excusable-but-noncompensable delays are straightforward to 
establish as occurring without fault or negligence of the contractor. 
Nonexcusable Delay 
 Nonexcusable delays are those for which the contractor bears sole responsibility, 
whether by faulty acts, negligence, or omission.  Previous research has classified the 
main causes of nonexcusable delays into twelve groups: materials, labor, equipment, 
financial, improper planning, lack of control, subcontractor, poor coordination, 
inadequate supervision, improper construction methods, technical personnel shortages, 
and poor communication (Majid & McCaffer, 1998).  For this type of delay, the 
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contractor is granted neither an extension of time nor additional funds.  Conversely, 
nonexcusable delays generally trigger the owner’s right to recover liquidated damages as 
set forth in the contract (Dale & D’Onofrio, 2014:14-15).  It is the responsibility of 
owners to establish that a project is delayed, which is simply accomplished by showing 
that the contractor failed to complete the project by the contracted date.  Subsequently, 
schedule delays are usually considered nonexcusable and the liability belongs to the 
contractor until proven otherwise by the contractor. 
Concurrent Delay 
 In situations where a period of the project suffers delays that impact the critical 
path, which are caused simultaneously by both parties, the delay is considered 
concurrent.  This is an analytical framework for liability apportionment used when there 
are overlapping time periods of both nonexcusable and compensable project delays.  
Concurrent delay can be difficult to assess when the periods of delay are offset or when 
the severity of the delay impacts the project differently (Smith et al., 2009:289).  
However, just as with all delay claims, modern techniques used to analyze project 
schedules have enabled adjudicating courts to discriminate more accurately between the 
portions of delay attributed to each party.   
Schedule Analysis 
 Considering the vast number of participants and complex nature of the 
construction industry, it is unsurprising that a variety of schedule delay analysis methods 
have been developed to assist professionals in dissecting occurrences within projects.  
Because projects tend to differ greatly from one another, diverse techniques are used to 
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understand each project’s schedule.  Furthermore, while all users of delay analysis 
methodologies share a common goal to understand “what happened when” during the 
course of a project, their end-purposes for analysis may diverge, particularly between 
sides of an adversarial dispute.  Unfortunately, the industry has become inundated with a 
surfeit of methods, with a particularly maligned naming convention.  While some 
methodologies carry multiple names for the same technique, some names have taken on 
multiple meanings.  In an effort to comprehensively identify, organize, describe, and 
compare the plethora of schedule delay analysis methods, the Association for the 
Advancement of Cost Engineering International (AACEI) published the Recommended 
Practice for Forensic Schedule Analysis (RP/FSA) in 2007 (Livengood, 2007).  By 
instituting a new, singular, and clarifying vocabulary for the industry, experts 
successfully collaborated to eliminate confusion. 
 The RP/FSA is wholly devoted to retrospective schedule analysis, which is used 
to examine project schedules after delay events occur, as opposed to prospective schedule 
analysis, which happens real-time to estimate future events, such as in monthly updates 
(RP/FSA, 2007:11).  Within the field of retrospective schedule analysis, the RP/FSA 
further utilizes four layers of hierarchical classification to establish a complete taxonomy 
of known schedule impact analysis methods.  The authors explain that most methods are 
variations of two schools of analysis: observational, which examines actual events, such 
as the As-Planned vs. As-Built (APAB) method; and modeled, in which analysts will 
include or exclude events to create various simulations to compare, such as the Time 
Impact Analysis (TIA) method.  The third taxonomy layer separates the field by specific 
methods.  Observational methods can use static or dynamic logic, which entails either 
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constraining the schedule logic to the as-planned network, or incorporating the changes to 
the network logic made during the project life.  Modeled methods can be additive or 
subtractive, meaning delays can be added to the baseline schedule or subtracted from a 
simulated as-built schedule (RP/FSA, 2007:13).  The final two layers of the taxonomy 
address the differences in how the various methods are implemented, including analysis 
period lengths, contemporaneous updates, schedule recreation, and baselining.  The 
organization is graphically depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Taxonomy of Forensic Schedule Analysis (RP/FSA, 2007) 
 
 In addition to classifying analysis methods, the RP/FSA compares and contrasts 
them, evaluating their associated strengths and weaknesses.  Several factors are 
considered in the comparison, including project contractual requirements, purpose of the 
analysis, data availability and reliability, size or complexity of the dispute, time or budget 
available for evaluation, and even the level of expertise of either the analyst or audience.  
For example, Method 3.1 Observational/Static/Gross (APAB) might be the easiest to 
understand and most technically simple to perform, but it is not suitable for long or 
complex projects.  On the other hand, Method 3.7 Modeled/Additive/Multiple Base 
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(TIA), which is commonly specified within government contracts, may be more accurate 
and intuitive for a complex project, but is perceived as a hypothetical model because it 
does not rely on an as-built schedule (RP/FSA, 2007:68).  For projects that have reliable 
as-built schedules, Method 3.8 Modeled/Subtractive/Single Simulation, popularly known 
as Collapsed As-Built (CAB), may be preferred.  In the CAB method, delay events are 
removed from the as-built schedule, which results in a model that shows what would 
have happened if it were not for the delay event.  A critical advantage of this method is 
its executability, requiring only a moderate amount of effort while still providing 
significant and accurate results.  Many of the other analysis methods require major efforts 
and thousands of hours of work; those are better suited for experts that have adequate 
staff to perform extensive support tasks, such as developing detailed daily as-builts 
schedules (Livengood, 2008). 
 There is some disagreement within the literature concerning the benefits and 
drawbacks of various methods, which is at least partially caused by the mixing of 
methodology names.  Lovejoy (2004) asserts that the Windows method, also known as 
the contemporaneous period analysis, is the most time consuming and costly to develop.  
However, her description of that method gravitates toward Method 3.7 in the RP/FSA 
due to its inclusion of modeling impacts after inserting delays into the nearest monthly 
schedule; the RP/FSA (2007:68) characterizes that method as quick and easy to 
implement.  Several authors declare TIA as the preferred method of schedule analysis, 
using a definition that most closely resembles Method 3.7.  Dale and D’Onofrio explain 
that TIA is preferred because it “chronologically and cumulatively evaluates project 
events utilizing the contemporaneous schedule updates and adjusts the completion date to 
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reflect as-built progress and any delays the same way a project is scheduled” (2014:285).  
However, Livengood (2006) insists that performing time impact analyses in hindsight is 
far less effective than performing an as-planned vs. as-built schedule delay analysis.  In a 
separate look at Method 3.8 (CAB), Zack (1999) argues that the method is commonly 
used to support delay claims.  Lovejoy agrees, but the RP/FSA (2007:76) explains that a 
disadvantage to Method 3.8 is that relatively few practitioners have significant, hands-on 
experience.  Regardless, it is evident that the appropriate selection and application of 
analysis methods is highly dependent on a variety of circumstances and there is no better 
source that more comprehensively and procedurally guides the process than the RP/FSA. 
 All of these methods rely on underlying principles established in the critical path 
method (CPM).  Traditionally, the critical path (or paths) of a project is defined as the 
chain of activities without any float; float is defined as the flexibility in scheduling an 
activity without it affecting other activities.  But modern scheduling practices have found 
practical uses for including float even in critical paths (Van de Vonder et al., 2008).  
Therefore, the critical path is more accurately defined as the sequence of events that, 
should they be delayed, will delay the completion of the project.  Thus, if an activity is 
delayed, and it does not impact the completion date of the project, that delay is not 
considered a schedule delay.  The importance of CPM to the schedule analysis process 
was noted by the courts when the justices wrote: “The only way to accurately assess the 
effect of the delays alleged on the project’s progress is to contrast updated CPM 
schedules prepared immediately before and immediately after each purported delay” 
(Blinderman v. US, 1997). 
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 It is important to note that consistent throughout the literature is an emphasis on 
the subjectivity of schedule analysis.  “Forensic scheduling analysis, like many other 
technical fields, is both science and art. As such, it relies on professional judgment and 
expert opinion and usually requires many subjective decisions” (RP/FSA, 2007).  The 
next section discusses the objective factors used to predict schedule performance before 
construction begins. 
Predicting Schedule Performance 
 Many models have been developed to help predict schedule performance in 
construction projects.  By identifying performance factors that cause delay before 
projects even begin, project managers may anticipate and prevent schedule overrun.  
Bromilow’s time-cost model—widely considered an industry standard—utilizes three 
cost factors to create an exponential regression model that predicts a project’s 
construction time (Bromilow, 1969).  Hoffman et al. (2007) used Bromilow’s instrument 
on 856 US Air Force projects that spanned a 16-year period, demonstrating that the 
model explained 37% of the variability—a remarkably significant result considering the 
complexity and diversity of such projects.  More intricate models that include various 
economic factors, such as interest rates and the contractor’s working capital and assets, 
can successfully predict schedule failure by using multivariate regression (Russel & Zhai, 
1996).  Both models demonstrate a strong correlation between schedule length and 
project cost; nevertheless, they rely heavily on final cost estimates, consequently utilizing 
uncertain factors to predict unknown schedules.  To predict the final costs of projects, 
Thal et al. (2010) developed a multivariate regression model and determined that the 
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primary input variable is a normalized design length ratio, which is the duration of the 
design period divided by the design cost.  However, that model’s usefulness is limited to 
design-bid-build projects, in which the design phase is completed before construction 
begins; nearly all military construction projects in the Middle East currently operate on a 
design-build basis, in which the design and build phases are executed concurrently.  
Thus, in order to predict construction delay, those three models establish the relationship 
between project costs and schedules, thereby revealing a list of potential delay factors: 
project cost, customer’s average time performance for a $1 million project, interest rates, 
value of the work after construction, and assets and working capital of the contractor.  
From the perspective of a government project management team, the only factor from 
that list that offers any useful opportunity for consideration is the last, namely the assets 
and working capital of the contractor.  While the other modeled factors are predetermined 
and cannot be influenced by the owner for a given project, the selection criteria of 
contractors may reasonably incorporate increased attention to their assets and working 
capital. 
  While those predictive models only expose one relevant delay factor for 
improving project schedule performance, other studies consider factors that project 
managers can influence more easily.  Chan et al. (2002) published a study concerning the 
critical success factors in design-build projects, organizing the results into five categories: 
project management actions, project procedures (procurement and tendering), external 
environment, human-related factors, and project-related factors (size, type, complexity).  
All of these success factors can impact a project schedule, and the study clearly 
demonstrates the effect that project owners and managers have on schedule delay. 
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Additionally, Russell & Jaselskis (1992) successfully created a quantitative model to 
predict project failure, which they define as either budget or schedule overruns, by 
focusing on factors central to the relationships between contractors and project owners.  
Their results demonstrate the importance of contractor evaluation prior to award, cost 
monitoring by owner, and senior management support for contractors, in order to 
improve schedule performance.  While acknowledging the inherent correlation between 
every project’s schedule and cost, this thesis seeks to further explore the root-causes of 
project delay.  Although many of the key factors in the aforementioned models overlap 
with factors of delay, they do not provide explanations or tools for project managers that 
will enable them to proactively reduce schedule overruns. 
Common Delay Factors 
 An exhaustive review of literature related to construction delay shows general 
consensus among academics in the identification of common causes of delay, 
notwithstanding dissent in their prioritization.  The following discussion of previous 
research illuminates the key factors already established in academia.  Gonzales et al. 
(2014) employed qualitative research methods to explore causes of construction schedule 
delay within three particular projects.  They concluded that four factors were the most 
problematic: planning, subcontracts, labor, and materials.  Unlike the delay factors 
revealed by the predictive models that were discussed in the previous section, these 
factors are centered on contractor responsibilities.  While that in-depth research is 
beneficial in its unique penetration into the complex minutiae that is typical of most 
large-scale construction projects, other studies use much larger sample sizes to reveal the 
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breadth of the issue.  Majid & McCaffer (1998) did so with a meta-analysis using an 
Ishikawa fishbone diagram, but focused only on factors that contributed to non-excusable 
delay.  They found that late delivery of materials or slow mobilization was the most 
significant factor leading to poor schedule performance of contractors.  Coming in at a 
distant second and third, the next most significant factors in their aggregate rating were 
damaged materials and poor planning, respectively.  Thus, material and planning were 
the main schedule delay causes. 
 Recognizing the dynamic nature of the construction industry, much of the 
research is scoped to determine the most significant causes of delay based on specific 
circumstances, such as geography, contract method, or project type.  Naturally, large-
scale construction projects can be influenced by variations in economics, politics, 
technology, and climates.  Over the last several decades researchers across the globe have 
conducted studies that systematically examine the causes of construction delay within 
individual countries.  The results from each of the ensuing studies, which use a variety of 
methodologies, establish a useful, industry-standardized foundation for determining the 
primary factors that cause schedule delay in typical construction projects.  The following 
table has been adapted and expanded from a regional study performed by Sweis et al. 
(2008). 
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Table 1 – Summary of previous studies of major delay factors in construction projects 
Country Author(s) Year Major Causes of Delay 
Egypt Abd El-Razek et 
al. 
2008 Contractor finances, progress payments, change orders, 
poor project management 
Ghana Frimpong et al. 2003 Progress payments, contractor management, material 
procurement, poor workmanship, price escalation 
Hong Kong Chan & 
Kumaraswamy 
1996 Identifying risks, site conditions, decision-making, change 
orders, work variations 
Indonesia Kaming et al. 1997 Change orders, labor productivity, poor planning, material 
shortages 
Iran Afshari et al. 2010 Incompetent subcontractors, poor change management, no 
lessons learned, material delivery 
Jordan Al-Moumani 2000 Poor design, change orders, weather, differing site 
conditions, late deliveries 
Jordan Odeh & Battaineh 2002 Labor productivity, contractor experience, owner 
interference, progress payments 
Jordan Sweis et al. 2008 Contractor finances, change orders 
Kuwait Koushki et al. 2005 Change orders, owner financial constraints, owner 
experience 
Lebanon Mezher et al. 1998 Financial issues (according to owners), contractual 
relationships (according to contractors), project 
management (according to consultants) 
Libya Tumi et al. 2009 Poor planning, poor communication, change orders,  
Malaysia Sambasivan & 
Soon 
2007 Poor planning, site management, contractor experience, 
owner finances, progress payments, material shortages, 
labor shortages 
Nigeria Mansfield et al. 1994 Financing and progress payments, poor contract 
management, differing site conditions, material availability, 
and improper planning 
Saudi Arabia Al-Ghafly 1995 Financial issues, change orders, owner decision-making, 
obtaining permits  
Saudi Arabia Assaf et al. 1995 Preparation and approval of drawings, progress payments, 
change orders, labor shortages, poor workmanship 
Saudi Arabia Al-Khal & Al-
Ghafly 
1999 Cash flow and financial issues, obtaining permits, lowest 
bid system 
Saudi Arabia Assaf & Al-Hejji 2006 Change orders, progress payments, poor planning, labor 
shortages, contractor financing 
Thailand Ogunlana et al. 1996 Industry infrastructure shortage, material availability, owner 
interference, incompetent contractors 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Faridi & El-
Sayegh 
2006 Preparation and approval of drawings, poor planning, owner 
decision-making, labor shortages, poor site management 
and supervision, low productivity 
Vietnam Long et al. 2004 Incompetent contractors, poor schedule estimates, poor 
schedule management, cultural and technical issues, site 
related issues, improper techniques and tools 
 
 The five most frequently repeated factors from Table 1 include: 1) design errors 
or change orders, 2) poor planning by contractors, 3) slow decision-making by owners, 4) 
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progress payments or other funding issues, and 5) labor shortages or workmanship.  
Except for progress payments, these five factors are relevant to large-scale US military 
projects and can be reasonably expected to occur in projects in GCC nations.  Although 
adequate funds for progress payments are never an issue in government projects, delayed 
progress payments by the government can certainly affect contractors’ finances.  This is 
even more significant in contingency environments, particularly in circumstances where 
the US government deliberately seeks out small, local contractors in order to strategically 
stimulate the local economy as part of broader reconstruction efforts. 
External Factors 
 While the previous section includes delay factors that are commonly found in 
research efforts from around the globe, this section concentrates on delay factors within 
projects that consist of parties from different countries and cultures.  Most of the 
literature categorizes cultural differences as an external delay factor, along with weather 
and security.  The list of the most significant or common factors affecting construction 
delay inevitably fluctuates in an overseas environment, particularly when there are 
significant cultural differences between project managers and contractors.  For example, 
the successful collaboration between US project managers and local national contractors 
often hinges on factors such as the business environment and human behavior, according 
to a construction management literary review conducted by Xue, Shen, and Ren (2010).  
There is some existing research that explores impacts to project management when 
engaging in construction business in foreign countries.  Chan (2004) mentions the 
influence of cultural effects in his comprehensive list of factors, but Kremers et al. (2010) 
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show that those cultural effects are magnified in wartime construction projects, 
particularly emphasizing a predictable surge of corruption and bribery. 
 Even in peacetime, cultural differences usually necessitate concessions from all 
parties involved in construction projects.  Pheng and Yuquan (2002) examined the 
frequent interactions between Chinese and Singaporean construction businesses, noting 
the need for project schedule adjustments in order to account for cultural allowances.  
Likewise, Baba (1996) recounts the prevalence of management procedure variation 
between eastern and western countries.  However, not all researchers agree on the 
significance of cultural impacts to project management.  While acknowledging minor 
influences of cultural differences, including geographic considerations, many scholars 
contest that the primary factors leading to schedule overrun in foreign countries are the 
same ones paralleled everywhere, which are listed in Table 1 (Al-Momani, 2000; Assaf 
& Al-Hejji, 2006; Ibbs, 2012; Marzouk & El-Rasas, 2014).  The study in Jordan by Odeh 
and Battaineh (2002) ranked external factors, including cultural differences, as the least 
significant for schedule delay causes.  However, they attribute that result to the moderate 
climate and well-established regulations in Jordan, where all parties are familiar with the 
construction environment and can anticipate and mitigate any impacts.  It is reasonable to 
expect that neither the climate nor regulations are as accommodating to project 
participants in contingency environments in the GCC. 
 Those studies provide an ample assessment of both the similarities and 
differences in the causes of construction delay in international construction projects.  In 
summary, several researchers demonstrate that common delay factors are magnified 
when there are cultural differences between parties involved in international construction 
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projects.  However, other studies minimize the significance of delay factors attributed to 
culture and location. 
Military Construction 
 There is little existing research regarding the specific issues that affect military 
construction in the Middle East.  However, there are three recent studies that analyze 
wartime construction challenges in Afghanistan.  The first was sponsored by USACE and 
performed by Affleck et al. (2011) who surveyed construction personnel regarding the 
most prevalent challenges in project execution.  In addition to the industry-established 
factors discussed previously, a few additional causes of construction delay that are unique 
to wartime scenarios were emphasized.  Security problems such as materiel theft or 
attacks against work-sites, supply convoys, and even project personnel stand out as key 
differences.  These factors are similar to issues cited by Enshassi (2009) in a study 
concerning construction delay affecting the Gaza Strip.  Enshassi found that strikes, 
border closures, military attacks, material shortages and delivery delays were the most 
important factors.  While many projects suffer from theft and vandalism in large 
construction projects in the US, it is rarely considered as significant industry-factor for 
delay (Berg et al., 2005).  Moreover, in typical US projects, many contractors do not even 
claim losses due to theft or vandalism because the costs are below insurance deductibles 
(Hoff, 2015).  In addition to security problems, many issues caused by general 
unfamiliarity with the physical environment and weather are exacerbated in wartime 
situations (Affleck et al., 2011). 
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 The second recent study regarding wartime construction challenges is an AFIT 
thesis by Jaszkowiak (2012) that analyzed USACE and AFCEC projects in Afghanistan 
to find key performance differences between various contracting methods.  In it, she 
found that the contracting method for a project can affect the behavior of contractors, and 
may lead to variation in schedule performance (Jaszkowiak, 2012).  In the third study, 
Hoff (2015) honed in on the primary factors that affect cost and schedule performance on 
projects completed in Afghanistan and examined the difference in outcomes based on 
contract types.  He found that project management factors are predictive of schedule 
delay, but external factors are not.  However, Hoff’s thesis focused on projects that were 
designed for the purpose of foreign nation-building, which is merely a tangential usage of 
military construction.  The conventional purpose of military construction is for US 
government use only, and streams from a different funding source altogether.  The 
significant differences between the intended purposes of the construction projects may 
affect design, funding, and contracting, so they may also reveal critical differences in 
project management factors that affect schedule overrun, as admitted by Hoff.   
 The results of those three recent research efforts on military projects provide 
important insight by identifying schedule delay factors common to the contingency 
environment, but they fail to address several issues concerning the causes of military 
construction delays or how to reduce them.  Moreover, while previous studies have 
developed several useful, predictive models for project performance, and other research 
efforts have established comprehensive lists of delay factors through survey instruments, 
no studies have used project records to identify causes of delay, and then applied forensic 
schedule analysis techniques to quantify construction delay impacts to US military 
 
25 
 
projects overseas.  Consequently, this thesis seeks to build upon the previous research 
efforts for a more in-depth analysis of AFCEC construction projects in the Middle East.  
Based on the literature review, several delay factors are expected to impact the projects 
selected for this research effort: design errors or change orders, poor planning by 
contractors, slow decision-making by owners, progress payments or other funding issues, 
labor shortages or workmanship, project management issues, and external environmental 
factors. 
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III.  Methodology 
 Because schedule overrun is often associated with—if not the direct cause of—
project cost overruns, several different delay analysis methods have been established in 
the construction industry.  While each technique can be characterized by various 
strengths and weaknesses, they all attempt to identify and quantify delays by isolating 
problems that occurred during the life of a project.  Many approaches are available, the 
most common of which rely heavily on meticulous investigations of project schedules, 
whether in their original, planned state before construction (as-planned) or in their actual, 
final state after construction (as-built). 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, a widely accepted, comprehensive taxonomy of all the 
different methodologies for forensic schedule analysis was established by a committee of 
recognized experts in the field of claims and dispute resolution (RP/FSA, 2007).   
Subsequently, Lowe & Nagata (2008) affirmed that all of the approaches that might be 
considered appropriate for the analysis of schedules and delays are presented in the 
RP/FSA.  They wrote: “given the thoroughness and objectivity of the process employed 
by the AACE International to develop the RP/FSA, this is believed to be a valid and 
easily defendable assumption” (Lowe & Nagata, 2008).  After thorough review, the 
committee agreed that each available method was a variation of either one of two primary 
methods: 1) Time Impact Analysis (TIA), or 2) As-Planned vs. As-Built (APAB) 
(Livengood, 2007).  In addition to defining the eight analysis methods, the RP/FSA 
provides significant discussion concerning the processes for reviewing project 
documentation and validating sources.  Utilizing those principles and procedures, this 
thesis develops a supplemental method, Project Documentation Analysis, for analyzing 
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delay in projects that are lacking project schedules, but that still have other documents 
that sufficiently account for delay events.  Essentially, this new method relies on the 
retrospective analysis of bilateral contract documents that explain delay apportionment, 
without the independent verification of project schedule review. 
 The data made available for this research precludes all analysis of any ongoing 
construction projects.  However, because the accessible data consists of recently 
completed projects, it allows for retrospective analysis.  Lovejoy (2004) asserts that “only 
after a project is substantially complete can a more detailed analysis of overall delays be 
effectively performed.”  Considering the advantages and disadvantages of various 
methods presented in the RP/FSA, as well as the purpose of analysis and the nature of 
accessible data for this research effort, one particular method stands out: Method 3.7 
Modeled/Additive/Multiple Base, popularly referred to as Time Impacted Analysis—
Adjusted (TIA).  The projects selected for analysis will be matched to the appropriate 
method after an initial review of documentation. 
Method 3.7 Modeled/Additive/Multiple Base 
 For projects that have reliable monthly schedule updates, this research will utilize 
Method 3.7 Modeled/Additive/Multiple Base, or TIA.  TIA does not require an as-built 
schedule.  Instead, it relies on the work progress information provided in monthly or 
regular schedule updates.  TIA is most often accepted as accurate for large, complex 
projects because of its consideration of the dynamic nature of the critical path.  
Additionally, most government projects specifically require the TIA method for any 
contractor claims submitted to the government for consideration.  Therefore, using the 
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same methodology for this research simplifies any potential comparisons to delay 
analyses performed by the contractor. 
 To begin the analysis, the project documentation is reviewed to understand the 
history and background of the scheduling issues.  Understanding the original purpose and 
scope of the project creates the requisite paradigm for analysis.  The next step is to 
identify project activities that impacted the final project completion date.  These activities 
are considered to be parts of the critical path, and the complete sequence of these 
activities makeup the entirety of the critical path.  They can be found within daily 
construction reports, material submittals, contractor invoices, government payment 
statements, contract modifications, and all other communication exchanges.  The 
significant milestone dates are readily available in the RMS project file, while the critical 
path is made evident by examination of the project schedule within the Primavera 
scheduling software. 
 After reviewing the project documentation, the next step is to review the as-
planned schedule in order to establish the baseline schedule against which delay impacts 
are measured.  The original schedule logic and the activity durations require validation; 
therefore they are checked for reasonableness.  Next, the delay events that were 
previously identified through examination of project documentation are listed, described, 
and then sequenced chronologically.  At this point, the presumed liability for each event 
is noted in the description for the purpose of apportionment.  As discussed in Chapter 2, 
if the delay event does not affect the completion date, it is not apportioned. 
 After defining the delay events, the next step in the TIA method is to create 
analysis periods or windows.  Then, within those windows, the impact to the project’s 
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forecasted completion date is measured in days.  Each delay event is compared to its 
contemporaneous schedule update, which also contains the as-built progress of the 
project.  Contemporaneous schedule updates are defined as the update that was 
completed just prior to the delay event.  The end date of each analysis period is 
determined by identifying the beginning of each delay event and matching it to its 
contemporaneous schedule update.  The beginning of each analysis period is determined 
by using the end date of the previous period, or in the case of the first analysis period, the 
beginning of the project. 
 After the windows of analysis are determined for each of the delay events, the 
first delay event is inserted into its analysis window to create a fragnet, or a sub-network, 
which is a new baseline for each window of analysis.  Next, the delay event is modeled 
by establishing logical links to predecessor and successor activities.  If the projected 
completion date is affected, the delay event is assessed for that window.  Then, the type 
of delay is apportioned based on the liability for the event.  Lastly, the number of days is 
determined by comparing the newly modeled completion date with the completion date 
from the contemporaneous schedule update. 
 For the second window of analysis, the steps are repeated for creating the new 
fragnet.  If a contemporaneous schedule update is not available, a copy of the impacted 
schedule from the previous window is created, and then updated with work progress up to 
the end date of the analysis window.  These steps are repeated until the last delay event is 
analyzed.  A summary of the analysis of apportioned delay days is created in tabular 
format to easily synthesize the results. 
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Project Documentation Analysis 
 For some projects, the as-planned and as-built schedules may not be available to 
the researcher for review.  Delay analysis may proceed if other project documentation 
sufficiently accounts for the entirety of the total delay period, which is determined from 
the difference between the planned, original contract completion date and the actual, final 
completion date.  However, this method is not preferred because it limits the 
opportunities to independently validate and verify the accuracy of each delay impact on 
the critical path by utilizing methods established in the RP/FSA. 
 The first step of this method is a thorough review of project documentation.  A 
review of the documents available in RMS provides the history and background of the 
schedule issues.  Understanding the original purpose and scope of the project creates the 
requisite paradigm for analysis.  The next step is to identify key sources of information 
that discuss project activities that impact the critical path and final completion date. The 
significant milestone dates are available in the RMS project file, along with comments 
regarding schedule changes entered into the system fields by the Project Manager. 
 Once the amount of delay is determined, accompanied by any notes input by 
government representatives, the project documentation review continues by examination 
of claims submitted by the contractor to the government for compensable delay.  As 
previously discussed, the burden of proof for compensation in delay claims belongs to the 
contractor, after the government establishes the occurrence of delay. 
 Next, the validity of each claim by the contractor is analyzed using a review of 
project documentation within RMS to identify corroborating responses from the 
government.  Communications and payment statements, which respond to contractor 
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claims and invoices, usually include details of government responses to the contractor 
claims. 
 Finally, the various sources of delay are listed, tabulated, and classified according 
to liability to complete the apportionment of delay for the project.  The number of delay 
days that impact the final completion date and can be reasonably attributed to the 
government are subtotaled as compensable delay.  The number of delay days that impact 
the final completion date and can be reasonably attributed to the contractor are subtotaled 
as non-excusable delay.  Any number of delay days that impact the final completion date 
for which the contractor and the government are concurrently liable are subtotaled as 
excusable delay.  Furthermore, any number of delay days that impact the final completion 
date but cannot be reasonably attributed to either party, are considered force majeure, and 
counted as excusable delay.  The grand total of the apportioned delay days should be 
equivalent to the total delay period established in the first step.  Any difference indicates 
unaccountable delay for the project. 
  
 The methods selected and crafted for this research effort are based on the 
RP/FSA, a comprehensive practitioner guide developed by industry experts.  The 
preferred method for this research is Method 3.7 (TIA), which is widely accepted as the 
most accurate analysis instrument for large, complex construction projects due to its 
ability to handle float and the dynamic nature of the critical path.  For projects that do not 
have sufficient project schedules, a Project Documentation Analysis is conducted, which 
relies on review of contract documents that bilaterally apportion delay. 
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
 In this chapter, the methodologies described in the previous chapter were applied 
to two construction projects in order to determine the primary causes of schedule delay in 
large-scale US military projects in the GCC. 
PROJECT 1 – Blatchford-Preston Complex, Phase 2 
 The first project selected for analysis was the construction of the Blatchford-
Preston Complex (BPC), Phase 2, at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar.  Its identifiers included a 
Contract ID of N0001918, a Contract Number of W912ER-11-C-0001, and a Project 
Number of 320779.  The project provided housing billets, or dormitory facilities, for US 
personnel assigned to Al Udeid Air Base.  BPC Phase 2 cost $60 million and was 
awarded on December 16, 2010 to the contractor Rizzani De Eccher (RdE).  The Notice 
to Proceed was issued on January 24, 2011 with a 741 day Period of Performance and a 
contract completion date of February 3, 2013.  However, execution of this project faced 
many difficulties throughout the duration, and substantial completion was not reached 
until December 30, 2014.  The project suffered 695 days of delay, or 93.8% schedule 
growth.  In addition to a nearly two-year delay, the project suffered significant cost 
growth of nearly $10 million, or 20%.  Due to those extreme results, the project was 
specifically requested for analysis by AFCEC at the onset of this research effort. 
 The first step of analysis was a thorough review of project documentation.  A 
review of the documents available in RMS provided the history and background of the 
schedule issues.  Understanding the original purpose and scope of the project created the 
requisite paradigm for analysis and aided in selection of the appropriate schedule analysis 
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method.  As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, proper method selection relies, in part, on 
what kind of project documentation is available.  Additionally, the document review step 
enabled identification of key sources of project activities that impacted the final project 
completion date.  The significant milestone dates were readily available in the RMS 
project file, while the critical path was made evident by examination of the project 
schedule in Primavera. 
 Based on several criteria, Method 3.7 Modeled/Additive/Multiple Base (TIA) was 
selected to use for analysis on the BPC project.  First, Method 3.7 does not require an 
as-built schedule, which was not available for this project.  Instead, it relies on the work 
progress information provided in monthly or regular schedule updates, of which this 
project had many.  Next, the sponsor was interested in thorough, accurate analysis in 
order to better understand the root-cause of project delay.  Method 3.7 is most often 
accepted as accurate for large, complex projects because of its consideration of the 
dynamic nature of the critical path.  Additionally, the project’s original contract 
specifically required the use of a “Windows Analysis” for any contractor claims 
submitted to the government for consideration.  While many different delay analysis 
methods are referred to as “Windows,” it was clear from the language within the various 
contractor claims that RdE assumed a methodology that conformed most closely to 
Method 3.7, and therefore presented much of its own schedule analysis in that format. 
 The next step was to review the as-planned schedule in order to establish the 
baseline against which to measure delay impacts.  For this project, the original schedule 
logic was validated and the durations of activities found to be reasonable.  Next, the delay 
events were identified through examination of project documentation.  Below, Table 2 
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lists the delay events specifically described in the schedule updates, claims submitted by 
the contractor, and notes that the government entered into RMS. 
 
Table 2 - Delay events in Project 1 
 Delay Event 
1 Additional Qatar Public Holidays (2012 & 2013 only) 
2 
Design Change – Fire Protection Strobe Lighting; 
New Requirement – Illuminated Notification Sign 
3 Design Delay – Blast Resistance Windows, Doors & Louvers 
4 New Requirement – Contractor to Provide Masonry Inspector 
5 Site Access – Al Udeid Air Base Closure 
6 Utility Delay – Power Upgrade Project (separate contractor) 
7 Permit Delay (Part 1) – Issuance of Building Permit 
8 Design Delay – Fire Sprinkler Systems Approval 
9 Permit Delay (Part 2) – Issuance of Building Permit 
10 Design Change – Fan Coil Unit 
 
Delay Event Descriptions 
 The following descriptions of the delay events were found within the claim 
submissions provided by the contractor to the government on February 28, 2013.  The 
events were then validated by reviewing comments by the government within RMS and 
the contracting officer’s response and payment certification. 
 1) Additional Qatar Public Holidays: Official authorities of Qatar declared in late 
2011 that the 2
nd
 Tuesday of every February would become a public holiday.  
Accordingly, 2 non-working days were added to the project schedule: February 14, 2012 
and February 12, 2013.  This event was beyond the control of either party, and therefore 
considered an excusable, non-compensable delay. 
 2) Design Change – Fire Protection Strobe Lighting; New Requirement – 
Illuminated Notification Sign: In March, 2012, the government made changes to the 
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design requirements of the fire protection strobe lighting, and added a requirement for 
illuminated notification signs.  This event was caused by the government and classified as 
a compensable delay. 
 3) Design Delay – Blast Resistance Windows, Doors & Louvers: During April, 
2012, the government failed to provide the specifications on-time required for the 
contractor design of blast resistant windows, doors, and louvres.  This delay was caused 
by the government and classified as a compensable delay. 
 4) New Requirement – Contractor to Provide Masonry Inspector: In June, 2012, 
the government added a requirement for the contractor to provide a masonry inspector.  
This delay was caused by the government and classified as a compensable delay. 
 5) Site Access – Al Udeid Air Base Closure: In August, 2012, the contractor’s 
access to the site was denied during a base closure event for 1 day.  This delay was 
caused by the government and classified as a compensable delay. 
 6) Utility Delay – Power Upgrade Project: In October, 2012, progress on the 
project was halted due to its reliance on a separate project for upgraded incoming 
permanent power supply.  The power projected was contracted between the government 
and a separate contractor (QIT).  RdE bore no responsibility for this delay, and the 
liability belonged to either the government or QIT, so it was therefore classified as a 
compensable delay. 
 7) Permit Delay (Part 1) – Issue of Building Permit: The government was 
obligated to obtain a building permit from Qatar authorities and provide to the contractor 
at the notice to proceed date of December 16, 2010.  However, the contractor was able to 
continue work activities (at their own legal risk) without the permit, until it prevented 
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them from procuring electrical equipment.  This delay event began to significantly impact 
project progress on October 1, 2012, and was partitioned into 2 analysis periods.  This 
delay was caused by the government and classified as a compensable delay. 
 8) Design Delay – Fire Sprinkler Systems Approval:  In January, 2013, the 
government issued a change order for the design of the fire sprinkler systems in the 
billets.  This delay was caused by the government and classified as a compensable delay. 
 9) Permit Delay (Part 2) – Issue of Building Permit:  The last schedule update 
included in the records made available to the researcher was dated December 31, 2012.  
However, it was clear from the contractor’s claim and government’s response that the 
permit delay continued at least until March 31, 2013.  There were no further indications 
of delay during that period.  Therefore the second part of the permit delay was also 
classified as compensable delay. 
 10) Design Change – Fan Coil Unit:  Through examination of contractor claim 
submittals and modifications to the contract approved by the government, a design 
change made to the project in July, 2013 was discovered.  Based on the 
acknowledgement from the government, this delay was classified as compensable delay. 
Delay Analysis Periods 
 For the next step in the TIA method, each delay event was inserted into an 
analysis window.  Then, within each window, the impact to the project’s forecasted 
completion date was measured in days.  To create a fragnet (a sub-network, or new 
baseline for each period of analysis), each delay event was compared to its 
contemporaneous schedule update, which also contained the as-built progress of the 
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project.  Below, Table 3 lists the delay events and their windows of analysis.  The end 
date of each analysis period was determined by identifying the beginning of each delay 
event and matching it to the contemporaneous schedule update.  The beginning of each 
analysis period was determined by using the end date of the previous period, or in the 
case of the first analysis period, the beginning of the project.  This data was collected 
from the contractor’s project schedules, claim submissions, and government inputs to 
RMS. 
 
Table 3 - Windows of analysis for delay events in Project 1 
 Delay Event Analysis Period 
1 Additional Qatar Public Holidays (2012 & 2013 only) 16-Dec-10 to 31-Jan-12 
2 
Design Change – Fire Protection Strobe Lighting; 
New Requirement – Illuminated Notification Sign 
31-Jan-12 to 29-Feb-12 
3 Design Delay – Blast Resistance Windows, Doors & Louvers 29-Feb-12 to 31-Mar-12 
4 New Requirement – Contractor to Provide Masonry Inspector 31-Mar-12 to 31-May-12 
5 Site Access – Al Udeid Air Base Closure 31-May-12 to 31-Jul-12 
6 Utility Delay – Power Upgrade Project (separate contractor) 31-Jul-12 to 30-Sep-12 
7 Permit Delay (Part 1) – Issuance of Building Permit 31-Jul-12 to 31-Dec-12 
8 Design Delay – Fire Sprinkler Systems Approval 30-Sep-12 to 31-Dec-12 
9 Permit Delay (Part 2) – Issuance of Building Permit 31-Dec-12 to 31-Mar-13 
10 Design Change – Fan Coil Unit 31-Mar-13 to 30-Dec-14 
 
Window 1: New Qatar National Holidays 
 The closest schedule update to the first delay event was the monthly progress 
update developed by the contractor, dated January 31, 2012. This update was copied over 
as “BPC Window 1” and used to create a fragnet to demonstrate delay.  In order to assess 
the effect of this delay event, the fragnet in Figure 2 was introduced into the schedule by 
inserting both new holidays as activities. 
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Figure 2 - Window 1 fragnet for Project 1 shows the holidays on the bottom three rows 
 
 To measure the impact of the schedule changes in Window 1, before and after 
images of the final completion date were captured.  The project completion date before 
impacts can be seen in Figure 3.  The project expected completion date was February 3, 
2013, which was the planned, original project completion date. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Project completion date before impact, based on the January, 2012 update 
 
 The next image displays the project completion date after computing the impacts 
of Window 1 delay events.  As seen Figure 4, the impacted project completion date 
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remained the same due to previously existing, unnecessary float associated with the 
critical path activities.  Therefore, the delay assessed to the project completion date in 
Window 1 was zero days. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Project completion date after impacted by delay events in Window 1 
 
Window 2: Design Change–Fire Protection Strobe Lighting, and New Requirement–
Illuminated Notification Sign 
 To analyze delay in Window 2, the impacted schedule from Window 1 was 
copied over as “BPC Window 2” and used to create a fragnet to demonstrate delay.  Next, 
Window 2 was updated according to the progress in the closest schedule update 
developed by the contractor, dated February 29, 2012.  In order to assess the effect of this 
delay event, the fragnet in Figure 5 was introduced into the schedule by inserting the 
missing activity named “Strobe Lighting & Notification Signs” and establishing logical 
links. 
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Figure 5 - Window 2 fragnet shows the delay event inserted, along with its subactivities 
 
 To measure the impact of the schedule changes in Window 2, before and after 
images of the final completion date were captured.  The project completion date before 
the new delay impacts can be seen in Figure 6.  The project expected completion date 
was February 3, 2013, consistent with the completion date from the previous analysis 
window. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Project completion date before impact, based on the February, 2012 update 
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 The next image, Figure 7, displays the project completion date after computing 
the impacts of Window 2 delay events.  Although the subactivities such as submission of 
shop drawings, procurement, and delivery were delayed for two months, there was 
sufficient float in that path and the assessed delay for Window 2 was zero days. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Project completion date after impacted by delay events in Window 2 
 
Window 3: Design Delay – Blast Resistance Windows, Doors & Louvers 
 To analyze delay in Window 3, the impacted schedule from Window 2 was 
copied over as “BPC Window 3” and used to create a fragnet to demonstrate delay.  Next, 
Window 3 was updated according to the progress in the closest schedule update 
developed by the contractor, dated Mar 31, 2012.  In order to assess the effect of this 
delay event, the fragnet in Figure 8 was introduced into the schedule by inserting the 
missing activity named “Blast Resistance Design for Windows, Doors and Louvers” (in 
black) and establishing logical links. 
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Figure 8 - Window 3 fragnet shows the delay event inserted with successor activities 
 
 To measure the impact of the schedule changes in Window 3, before and after 
images of the final completion date were captured.  The project completion date before 
the new delay impacts can be seen in Figure 9.  The project expected completion date 
was February 11, 2013, indicating 8 days of unexplained or otherwise non-excusable 
contractor delay when compared to the date from the previous window, February 3, 2013. 
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Figure 9 - Project completion date before impact, based on the March, 2012 update 
 
 The next image displays the project completion date after computing the impacts 
of Window 3 delay events.  As seen in Figure 10, the impacted project completion date 
was changed to May 2, 2013, demonstrating a total delay of 88 days, including the 8 days 
of unexplained or otherwise non-excusable delay found in Figure 9.  This indicated 80 
days of compensable delay in Window 3 due to the design delay caused by the 
government for the requirement to install blast resistant windows, doors, and louvers. 
 
 
Figure 10 - Project completion date after impacted by delay events in Window 3 
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Window 4: New Requirement – Contractor to Provide Masonry Inspector 
 To analyze delay in Window 4, the impacted schedule from Window 3 was 
copied over as “BPC Window 4” and used to create a fragnet to demonstrate delay.  Next, 
Window 4 was updated according to the progress in the closest schedule update 
developed by the contractor, dated May 31, 2012.  In order to assess the effect of this 
delay event, the fragnet shown in Figure 11 was introduced into the schedule by inserting 
the missing activity named “Masonry Inspector” (in black) and establishing logical links. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Window 4 fragnet shows the delay event inserted, with its successor activities 
 
 To measure the impact of the schedule changes in Window 4, before and after 
images of the final completion date were captured.  The project completion date before 
the new delay impacts can be seen in Figure 12.  The project expected completion date 
was April 15, 2013, indicating 17 days of acceleration when compared to the date from 
the previous window, May 2, 2013. 
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Figure 12 - Project completion date before impact, based on the May, 2012 update 
 
 The next image, Figure 13 displays the project completion date after computing 
the impacts of Window 4 delay events.  As seen below, the impacted project completion 
date was changed back to May 2, 2013.  This signified that the government-caused delay 
in Window 4 only impacted the contractor’s opportunity to accelerate progress, resulting 
in a compensable delay of 17 days. 
 
 
Figure 13 - Project completion date after impacted by delay events in Window 4 
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Window 5: Site Access – Al Udeid Air Base Closure 
 To analyze delay in Window 5, the impacted schedule from Window 4 was 
copied over as “BPC Window 5” and used to create a fragnet to demonstrate delay.  Next, 
Window 5 was updated according to the progress in the closest schedule update 
developed by the contractor, dated July 31, 2012.  In order to assess the effect of this 
delay event, the fragnet in Figure 14 was introduced into the schedule by inserting the 
missing activity named “Closure of Air Base” (in black). 
 
 
Figure 14 - Window 5 fragnet shows the base closure event on the bottom two rows 
 
 To measure the impact of the schedule changes in Window 5, before and after 
images of the final completion date were captured.  The project completion date before 
the new delay impacts can be seen in Figure 15.  The project expected completion date 
was June 10, 2013, indicating 39 days of unexplained or otherwise non-excusable 
contractor delay when compared to the date from the previous window, May 2, 2013. 
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Figure 15 - Project completion date before impact, based on the July, 2012 update 
 
 The next image displays the project completion date after computing the impacts 
of Window 5 delay events.  As seen in Figure 16, the impacted project completion date 
remained at June 10, 2013, the same date shown in the July 31, 2012 update (Figure 15).  
Therefore, the delay assessed to the project completion date in Window 5 remains as 39 
days of non-excusable contractor delay. 
 
 
Figure 16 - Project completion date after impacted by delay events in Window 5 
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Extension of Time Awarded 
 Due to the delay caused by the associated (but separately contracted) utility 
project to upgrade incoming power supply, the government awarded an extension of time 
for this project completion date.  The period of performance was extended by 22 days, 
pushing the expected completion date back to July 2, 2013 (from June 10, 2013).  
However, the duration of this extension was disputed by the contractor, RdE, who argued 
that the delay further impacted the schedule, beyond the granted extension.  That claim is 
analyzed in Window 6.  Based on the extension awarded by the government, 22 days of 
compensable delay were assessed in between Windows 5 and 6. 
 
Window 6: Utility Delay – Power Upgrade Project 
 To analyze delay in Window 6, the impacted schedule from Window 5 was 
copied over as “BPC Window 6” and used to create a fragnet to demonstrate delay.  Next, 
Window 6 was updated according to the progress in the closest schedule update 
developed by the contractor, dated September 30, 2012.  In order to assess the effect of 
this delay event, the fragnet in Figure 17 was introduced into the schedule by inserting 
the missing activity named “QIT Additional Work” (in black) and establishing logical 
links. 
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Figure 17 - Window 6 fragnet shows the delay event inserted, with its successor activities 
 
 To measure the impact of the schedule changes in Window 6, before and after 
images of the final completion date were captured.  The project completion date before 
the new delay impacts can be seen in Figure 18.  The project expected completion date 
was July 31, 2013, indicating 29 days of unexplained or otherwise non-excusable 
contractor delay when compared to the date from the previous window, July 2, 2013. 
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Figure 18 - Project completion date before impact, based on the September, 2012 update 
 
 The next image displays the project completion date after computing the impacts 
of Window 6 delay events.  As seen in Figure 19, the impacted project completion date 
was changed to August 22, 2013, indicating 51 days of delay in Window 6, including the 
29 days of unexplained or otherwise non-excusable delay, along with 22 days of 
compensable delay.  These 22 days of delay should not be confused with the 22 days 
already granted as an extension by the government for the same delay event.  Therefore, 
the 22 days granted should have been 44 days and the contractor was responsible for 
another 29 days of non-excusable delay. 
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Figure 19 - Project completion date after impacted by delay events in Window 6 
 
Window 7: Permit Delay (Part 1) – Issuance of Building Permit 
 The delay event in Window 7 overlapped with the delay event in Window 6.  
Therefore, the same schedule update developed by the contractor, dated September 30, 
2012, was used to create a fragnet to demonstrate delay.  In order to assess the effect of 
this delay event, the fragnet in Figure 20 was introduced into the schedule by inserting 
the missing activity named “Building Permit” (in black) and establishing logical links. 
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Figure 20 - Window 7 fragnet shows the delay event inserted, along with its sub-activities 
 
 To measure the impact of the schedule changes in Window 7, before and after 
images of the final completion date were captured.  The project completion date before 
the new delay impacts can be seen in Figure 21.  The project expected completion date 
was July 31, 2013, indicating the same 29 days of unexplained or otherwise non-
excusable contractor delay that were found in Window 6. 
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Figure 21 - Project completion date before impact, based on the September, 2012 update 
 
 The next image displays the project completion date after computing the impacts 
of Window 7 delay events.  As seen in Figure 22, the impacted project completion date 
was changed to January 25, 2014, indicating 207 days of delay in Window 7, including 
the 29 days of unexplained or otherwise non-excusable delay already apportioned in 
Window 6, along with 178 days of compensable delay.  Because the compensable delays 
in Windows 6 and 7 were concurrent, only the delays found in Window 7 were assessed. 
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Figure 22 - Project completion date after impacted by delay events in Window 7 
 
Window 8: Design Delay – Fire Sprinkler Systems Approval 
 To analyze delay in Window 8, the impacted schedule from Window 7 was 
copied over as “BPC Window 8” and used to create a fragnet to demonstrate delay.  Next, 
Window 8 was updated according to the progress in the closest schedule update 
developed by the contractor, dated December 31, 2012.  In order to assess the effect of 
this delay event, the fragnet in Figure 23 was introduced into the schedule by inserting 
the missing activity named “Fire Sprinkler System” (in black) and establishing logical 
links. 
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Figure 23 - Window 8 fragnet shows the delay event inserted, along with its sub-activities 
 
 To measure the impact of the schedule changes in Window 8, before and after 
images of the final completion date were captured.  The expected completion date before 
impacted by the delay event was January 25, 2014, which was the same date established 
in Window 7.  Figure 24 displays the project completion date after computing the impacts 
of Window 8 delay events.  Despite 30 days of delay to Fire Sprinkler System activities, 
the impacted project completion date remained as January 25, 2014.  This indicated that 
there were no impacts to the project’s critical path.  Therefore, the delay assessed to the 
project completion date in Window 8 was zero days. 
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Figure 24 - Project completion date after impacted by delay events in Window 8 
 
Window 9: Permit Delay (Part 2) – Issuance of Building Permit 
 The project expected completion date of January 25, 2014 was calculated in 
Window 7 based on a claim submission cutoff date of January 31, 2013 for issuance of 
the building permit.  However, while the remaining documentation for the project was 
incomplete, it was clear from email exchanges between the contractor and government 
that the permit was issued no earlier than March 31, 2013.  Furthermore, there was no 
indication from any available project documentation of any other sources of delay.  
Therefore, the expected completion date was delayed until March 25, 2014, and 59 days 
of compensable delay were assessed within Window 9. 
 
Window 10: Design Change – Fan Coil Unit 
 Although no further project schedule updates were available for schedule 
analysis, other project documentation found in RMS provided additional details 
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concerning project delay events.  On July 16, 2013, the contractor submitted claim 0151 
to the government requesting an extension of 91 days to the Period of Performance, as 
well as additional funds (indicating a compensable delay), due a design change made by 
the government regarding the fan coil units.  The government acknowledged the 
extension of time and a negotiated payment in the contract modification P00013, dated 
February 27, 2014.  Therefore, 91 days of compensable delay were assessed within 
Window 10. 
Summary of Delay Impacts 
 Table 4 shows the aggregated results from the analysis windows.  The first two 
columns label the analysis periods.  The third column shows the date from each event that 
was used in its respective window to run the fragnet in Primavera.  The fourth column 
displays the Rolling Finish, which is the impacted project completion date from the 
preceding analysis window.  The fifth column shows the expected completion date of the 
project based on the contemporaneous schedule update that includes as-built progress, but 
before consideration of any impacts from the delay event.  The sixth column shows the 
delta, number of days between the Rolling Finish and the Date Before Impact.  The Delta 
Before Impact will typically indicate unexplained delay or non-excusable delay, if a 
positive integer, or acceleration if a negative integer.  The seventh column shows the 
expected completion date of the project based on the impacts of each delay event inserted 
into its respective fragnet.  The final column shows the delta, number of days between the 
Date Before Impact and the Impacted Date.  This number indicates the total number of 
delay days for the window.  Note that Table 4 shows two values that are struck through in 
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Windows 6 and 8, representing delays that were apportioned, but later removed to 
prevent double-counting in Windows 7 and 9, respectively.  Those delay days 
apportioned to Windows 6 and 8 were overcome by the delay events in Windows 7 and 9. 
 
Table 4 – Summary of delay impacts for Project 1 
Win-
dow 
Delay Event Data Date 
Rolling 
Finish 
Date 
Before 
Impact 
Delta 
Before 
Impact 
Impacted 
Date 
Delta 
After 
Impact 
1 Additional Qatar 
Public Holidays  
31-Jan-12 3-Feb-13 3-Feb-13 0 3-Feb-13 0 
2 Strobe Lighting; 
Notification Sign 
29-Feb-12 3-Feb-13 3-Feb-13 0 3-Feb-13 0 
3 Blast Resistance 
Windows, Doors  
31-Mar-12 3-Feb-13 11-Feb-13 8 2-May-13 88 
4 Provide Masonry 
Inspector 
31-May-
12 
2-May-13 15-Apr-13 -17 2-May-13 0 
5 Al Udeid Air 
Base Closure 
31-Jul-12 2-May-13 10-Jun-13 39 10-Jun-13 39 
 Time Extension  10-Jun-13 10-Jun-13 0 2-Jul-13 22 
6 Power Upgrade 
Project 
30-Sep-12 2-Jul-13 31-Jul-13 
29 
0 
22-Aug-
13 
22 
0 
7 Permit Delay  
(Part 1) 
31-Jan-13 2-Jul-13 31-Jul-13 29 25-Jan-14 207 
8 Fire Sprinkler 
Systems  
31-Dec-12 
18-Nov-
13 
18-Nov-
13 
0 18-Dec-13 
30 
0 
9 Permit Delay  
(Part 2) 
31-Mar-13 25-Jan-14 25-Jan-14 0 25-Mar-14 59 
10 Fan Coil Unit 27-Feb-14     91 
 
 Next, Table 5 shows the total number days of delay based on classification, as 
described in the previous sections.  The total number of delay days was determined by 
subtracting the original contract completion date, February 3, 2013 from the actual 
substantial completion date of December 30, 2014.  The number of unaccountable days 
was determined by subtracting the known subtotals of delay from the total number of 
delay days. 
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Table 5 – Summary of delay apportionment for Project 1 
Type of Delay Description 
Number 
of Days 
Compensable Design Delay (Blast Doors) 80 
 Design Change (Masonry Inspector) 17 
 Other Project (Power Upgrade) 22 
 Building Permit 237 
 Design Change (Fan Coil Unit) 91 
 Subtotal 447 
Non-excusable Window 3 8 
 Window 5 39 
 Window 7 29 
 Subtotal 76 
Excusable  0 
Unaccountable No documentation available 172 
 TOTAL DELAY 695 
 
PROJECT 2 – Replace Fuel Line 
 The second project selected for analysis was the replacement of a fuel line at Al 
Dhafra Air Base, United Arab Emirates (UAE).  Its identifiers included a Contract 
Number of W912ER-09-C-0050, and a Project Number of 321566.  The project replaced 
an existing, expeditionary fuel line with a new, permanent fuel line that connected Al 
Dhafra Air Base to an off-base fuel source.  This project was awarded at $5.6 million and 
began construction on July 20, 2009.  371 days were provided as a Period of 
Performance, with an original contract completion date of July 26, 2010.  However, 
execution of this project suffered several delays, and the project was not completed until 
December 16, 2010.  In total, the project suffered 143 days of delay, resulting in 38.5% 
schedule growth.  In addition to the significant delay, the project suffered cost growth of 
nearly $650 thousand, or 11%.  Although there were relatively few projects to choose 
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from in the UAE that met the project selection criteria discussed in Chapter 1, this project 
was selected for analysis due to its significant schedule growth. 
 The first step of analysis was a thorough review of project documentation.  A 
review of the documents available in RMS provided the history and background of the 
schedule issues.  Understanding the original purpose and scope of the project created the 
requisite paradigm for analysis.  Additionally, the document review step enabled 
identification of key sources of project activities that impacted the final project 
completion date.  The significant milestone dates were readily available in the RMS 
project file.  However, no project schedules were made available in Primavera. 
 Without an as-built or as-planned schedule for review, the Replace Fuel Line 
project was wholly analyzed using a review of project documentation within RMS to 
identify the various sources of delay.  As such, the opportunities to independently 
validate and verify the accuracy of each delay impact by utilizing methods established in 
the RP/FSA were unavailable.  However, unlike the BPC project analyzed as Project 1, 
the documentation for Project 2 allowed the researcher to account for the entirety of the 
143 days of delay, and therefore complete the apportionment of delay for the project. 
 As previously discussed, the burden of proof for compensation in delay claims 
belongs to the contractor.  Therefore, the project documentation review continued by 
examination of claims submitted by the contractor to the government for compensable 
delay.  The contractor submitted three separate claims that requested compensation for a 
total of 107 days of delay.  These claims were validated by the government through a 
negotiated settlement on January 7, 2011, which occurred three weeks after the project 
completed.  In that negotiation, the contractor requested an extension of time to the 
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contract completion date, as well as additional funds as compensation for the delays 
caused by the government.  However, while the government agreed to the extension of 
time for all of the delays claimed by the contractor, they were not all considered 
compensable.  During the negotiation, the government showed that more than half of the 
delays were concurrent with delays caused by the contractor.  Accordingly, the parties 
bilaterally apportioned the delays as compensable, excusable, or divided between the two 
categories.  The following table lists the delay events, the number of compensable days 
claimed by the contractor, and then the apportionment of delay days between 
compensable and excusable categories, as agreed to by both parties. 
 
Table 6 – Summary of delay impacts for Project 2 
Delay Event 
Original 
Claim 
Compensable 
Delay 
Excusable 
Delay 
No Host Nation Agreement for 
construction 
79 days 40 days 39 days 
Badge Pass Processing 4 days  4 days 
Gate Access Delays 3 days  3 days 
Design Change – revised pipeline 
alignment 
17 days 2 days 15 days 
Ramadan Delays  4 days  4 days 
Total 107 days 42 days 65 days 
 
 As seen in the table above, the contractor was able to prove that the government 
was liable for at least a portion of two delay events that impacted the critical path of the 
project.  Typically, without the delay impact analysis, liability for four of those five delay 
events might be attributed to the government.  The responsibility to obtain a Host Nation 
Agreement to proceed with construction always belongs to the government.  However, 
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the government was able to prove that the contractor concurrently caused delay to the 
critical path during 39 of the 79 days of delay caused by that event, though the details of 
the contractor-caused delay were not specified.  Likewise, liability for delays to the 
badging process and access to the site through the base gate were not discussed in great 
detail.  While both processes are controlled by the government, the contractor should 
anticipate a reasonable amount of delay associated with those activities when creating the 
project schedule.  Without explicit descriptions indicating whether those “site access” 
delays were extraordinary, it was reasonable for the government to consider those two 
events excusable, but not compensable.  The next delay event, a design change by the 
government issued in Contract Modification P0001, revised the alignment of the pipeline, 
and impacted the critical path by 17 days.  However, the government demonstrated, once 
again, concurrent (but unspecified) delay by the contractor along the critical path, and 
thereby divided the delay into 2 days of compensable delay and 15 days of excusable 
delay.  Finally, as the project completion date shifted from July 26, 2010 to December 16, 
2010, the project schedule included the 30-day period of Ramadan.  In 2010, the dates of 
Ramadan extended from August 11 to September 9.  While religious observance of 
Ramadan does not preclude work activities, there are restricted hours of construction 
work in GCC countries in order to limit the exposure of laborers to direct sunlight during 
the hottest periods.  Typically, those reduced hours are reflected in project schedules, but 
the original schedule for this project ended before Ramadan, 2010.  The apportionment of 
delay to the critical path caused by Ramadan was therefore classified as excusable, but 
not compensable. 
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 Next, there were 36 days of remaining delay not accounted for in the agreement 
negotiated on 7-Jan-11.  Because the agreement was negotiated after the completion of 
the project, and there were no further claims by the contractor, the remaining days can be 
apportioned as non-excusable delay.  There was no project documentation in RMS that 
provided any explanation of the cause of the contractor delay.  The final count of 
apportioned delay for Project 2 is shown in the table below. 
 
Table 7 – Summary of delay apportionment for Project 2 
Type of Delay Number of Days 
 
Compensable 42 
Excusable 65 
Non-excusable 36 
Total 143 
 
Discussion of Results 
 The methods discussed in Chapter 3 were successfully applied to two projects 
completed by AFCEC and USACE in the GCC and provided useful results.  All of the 
delay events that affected the two projects (that were accountable from available records) 
fell under the categories of delay factors that were expected based on the literature review 
in Chapter 2.  Significance of these findings are discussed further in Chapter 5.  
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V.  Conclusion 
 This chapter provides some additional discussion on the results from the analysis 
completed in the previous chapter.  It discusses the significant findings from the analysis 
by grouping delay factors into meaningful categories, and then identifies the dominant 
construction delay factor affecting large-scale military projects based on the two analyzed 
projects.  It also includes recommendations to the sponsor based on the literature review 
and analysis results, and provides suggestions for additional future research efforts in 
order to better understand the causes of delay in military construction projects. 
Review of Findings 
 Review of the results from the schedule delay analysis of Projects 1 and 2 reveal 
several significant findings.  By using the delay factor categories established by previous 
literature, several of the delay events can be grouped to provide meaningful descriptions.  
Together, the top two delay factors from Projects 1 and 2 account for 62% of the total 
delay and are discussed in further detail. 
 Obtaining building permits was the dominant delay factor for Projects 1 and 2, a 
responsibility of the project owner, or in this case, the government.  Between the two 
projects, this factor was the cause of 316 combined delay days, or 38% of the total delay 
between the two projects, as well as the accompanying cost overruns.  However, the 
significance of this finding is slightly tempered after considering the following two 
points. 
 As project managers have little influence to affect schedule delay caused by 
construction permits that are controlled by host nation offices, the natural solution is to 
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postpone contract award or Notice to Proceed until permit issuance.  However, it is 
unknown regarding these two projects if the project managers might have had a 
reasonable expectation for the permits to be issued before they would impact the critical 
paths, either based on precedence for that location or for that specific type of permit. 
 Second, even if the impact of the delay factor was recognized or anticipated, the 
priority of the mission may have driven the government to award the project contract and 
issue Notice to Proceed regardless of the anticipated delay and associated costs.  Even 
though delaying the Notice to Proceed until all necessary permits are secured would 
reduce the total period of performance, shorten the duration of the project, and save the 
government substantial funds in compensable delays paid to the contractor, it would not 
have improved the completion date of the project.  If the mission requirement that drives 
the project prioritizes the earliest possible completion date, then the government is likely 
still better off issuing the Notice to Proceed as early as possible and face the risk of this 
dominant delay factor.  Nevertheless, an important takeaway from this result is that large-
scale military construction projects can significantly reduce schedule overrun by 
obtaining all required permits before the projects begin.  While permit delays are not 
unique to construction projects in the GCC, the geopolitical landscape and contingency 
environment likely exacerbate the problem. 
 Unsurprisingly, design issues were the second most substantial delay factor in 
Projects 1 and 2.  Delays caused by design issues accounted for 24.5% of the total delay.  
For the purpose of this research, the term “design issues” encompasses two sub-factors.  
The first consists of changes to the initial design.  The changes may originate from design 
errors or omissions, or emerge during construction as customer needs and mission 
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requirements evolve—not unusual during the course of large-scale projects with long 
durations.  The second design issue sub-factor was government delay to approve 
submittals.   Submittals entail any kind of document or sample that the contractor 
provides to the owner for verification and approval; common examples include shop 
drawings, material data, samples, and product data. 
 Just as with permit delay, design issues are unique to neither the type nor location 
of the projects analyzed in this study.  Still, it is rational to expect that the extremely high 
turnover rate of personnel and the relatively dynamic nature of mission requirements in 
contingency environments magnify delays caused by design issues.  In order to reduce 
schedule delay to GCC projects caused by design issues, a number of recommendations 
can be made. 
 Assuming that all design change orders that cause delay in construction projects 
are actually necessary changes and cannot be simply prohibited, the attention for delay 
mitigation shifts to prevention.  Preventing design changes requires improvements to 
various aspects of project management.  Several management areas, as delineated in the 
“Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge” (PMI, 2013) can specifically 
affect the quality of construction designs and reduce delays from design changes.  These 
include scope management, schedule management, quality management, and change 
management.  There are many proven industry tools and best practices that can increase 
the toolbox size of schedule control management skills and techniques available to 
government project managers.  It is important to note here that the methodologies 
discussed and utilized in this research were retrospective analysis methods, which are 
appropriate for identifying and understanding the causes of delay after project 
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completion.  Different methods are available and better suited to use as prospective tools, 
concurrent with the project life to enable delay analysis predictively and proactively. 
 To reduce delays related to submittal approvals, project managers can take two 
approaches.  First, they can reduce the amount of time required to review and approve 
submittals by improving processes.  Communication, subject matter expertise, and 
resources (time and manpower) all play important roles in those processes.  Second, they 
can improve project schedule estimates by incorporating more accurate durations for 
submittal review and approval activities.  Once submittal approval delays cannot be 
further reduced due to resource constraints, or when approval processes reach their 
maximum optimization, then more realistic durations must be utilized in project 
schedules.  A failure point in many project schedules is the false assumption that 
submittals will be immediately approved. 
 These findings establish the need for the government to improve its project 
management training program, specifically in the area of schedule control management.  
Limitations on time, resources, and data accessibility generated momentous constraints 
for this research effort.  High fidelity schedule analysis on complex, large-scale 
construction projects usually requires hundreds of hours and thorough review of project 
documents, which may number in the thousands.  While this study was limited to 
examination of two projects, it is clear that project management-focused departments 
within USACE and AFCEC will benefit by consistently performing forensic schedule 
analysis on all completed projects that suffer significant schedule delays.   Doing so will 
provide more lessons and reveal areas for improvement, and perhaps expose patterns of 
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avoidable mistakes.  Additionally, collation of such data will provide opportunities for 
more advanced investigation of project delays by enabling statistical meta-analysis. 
 In order to improve project schedule management for large-scale construction, it 
is recommended that USACE and AFCEC develop processes to identify, collect, and 
record reliable delay data—independent from the contractor.  However, it must be 
acknowledged that by doing so, the government does not wish to take on any additional 
schedule risk.  It is clear that current procurement strategies emphasize use of delivery 
methods that shift risk to the contractors.  But it appears, based on project data reviewed 
in RMS, that the government relies too heavily on contractors to create and update as-
built schedules during the course of projects.  Considering the scarcity of details currently 
tracked by the government, it is a wonder that the government ever prevails in legal 
disputes about schedule delay that are decided by claims courts.  Furthermore, difficulties 
in actively controlling schedule delay, as well as post hoc analysis, are intensified when 
the government rejects project schedule updates submitted by contractors simply because 
they reflect delays to the project completion date.  Gannon (2011) identifies and discusses 
several such schedule management shortfalls in his examination of the federal design-
build procurement program.  Some misaligned policies are tantamount to closing one’s 
eyes and wishing the problem away.  More importantly, it prevents cooperative problem-
solving efforts that are critical in project management. 
Additional Future Research 
 While project cost overruns are easy to measure and the impacts are simple to 
quantify, future qualitative research efforts may discover ways to measure the 
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significance of actual mission impacts caused by schedule overruns.  Such studies may 
answer a question such as, “Besides financial waste, how do schedule overruns really 
impact military missions?” 
 Other questions that future research could consider include:  
“Are specific delay factors more prevalent in projects using certain contract delivery 
methods?” 
“Do military construction projects accept too much schedule risk?” 
“Do government construction managers receive adequate project scheduling training?” 
 Collation of data from many more forensic schedule analyses will provide further 
research opportunities of project delays by enabling statistical meta-analysis.  Such 
analysis will explain the frequency, probability, significance, and uniqueness of various 
delay factors in military construction in the GCC.  Additionally, it is recommended for 
future studies to achieve greater fidelity in results by acquiring project documentation 
from all parties involved in projects.  The source data used in this research effort was 
based solely on government documentation.  While projects that suffer project delay are 
often disputed and likely impede the willingness of contractors to share controversial 
documentation, fully resolved cases should provide sufficient and more easily obtainable 
data. 
Summary 
 This research conducted forensic schedule analysis of delay factors that impacted 
recent large-scale military construction projects in the Middle East.  The purpose of this 
study was to understand the most significant causes of project delay and how AFCEC 
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might improve schedule performance.  The methodologies for analysis were adapted 
from the RP/FSA, particularly Method 3.7 Modeled/Additive/Multiple Base, or TIA.  
The data was gathered from USACE and AFCEC, consisting of Primavera project 
schedules and project documents from the RMS database.  The project delays from two 
large-scale projects were apportioned as compensable, excusable, or non-excusable based 
on their liability and their impacts to the critical path.  This investigation revealed that 
two particular delay factors were the most significant contributors to schedule overrun, 
accounting for 62% of the 838 days of total delay.  Obtaining permits, an owner 
(government) responsibility, contributed to 38% of those delays.  Design issues, 
consisting of change orders and submittal approvals, accounted for another 24% of the 
delays.  In order to reduce schedule delay in future projects, several recommendations 
were provided to improve project management. 
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